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ARTICLES
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE THIRD
WORLD
A. A. Fatouros*
After a detailed examination of the unique position of the emerging
nations, the "third 'world," Professor Fatourosurges that the Western
nations should undertake a change in approach and a reassessment of
the objectives of internationallaw since the present situation of international society is so dissimilar to that in which the law evolved. He
concludes that special, new rules should be formulated, based on a
broad and positive consideration of the urgent need of the emerging
nations to develop their natural resources as effectively and as rapidly
as possible-a need 'which internationallaw must take into account if
it is to be meaningful to the third world nations and if they are expected to be effective, responsible members of the international legal
community.

T

I-E two major facts of contemporary international life are the
conflict between the Western and the Soviet blocs and the emergence and increasing importance of a "third world," the new group of
states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.' Both are constantly in the
minds of those in control in national and international affairs and thus
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago, U. Dipl.,

1955,

National

University of Athens; M.C.L., 1956, LL.M., 1957, J.S.D., 1962, Columbia University.
Mr. Fatouros will join the faculty of Indiana University in the fall.
The author would like to thank his hosts at the University of Chicago for their
patience in submitting to repeated discussions on this topic. In particular, he wishes to
express his gratitude to Professor Soia Mentschikoff for her stimulating suggestions,
and to Professor Kenneth V. Dam for his cogent criticism of a draft of this article.
1. The terms "bloc" and "group" are used here interchangeably to describe groupings
of states of varying degrees of cohesion. The terminological problems involved are
discussed succinctly in FARAJALL-AH, LE GROUPE AFRO-ASIATIQUE DANS LE CADRE DES
NAT NS Ums 4-6 (1963).
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directly influence the processes and structures of the international community. The present paper is an inquiry into the effects on international
law of the second of these major facts. Most of these effects are not
yet manifest; accordingly, this study is, in major part, an exercise in
prophecy. As such, it cannot pretend to do more than identify and
describe certain trends which are today discernible and point out the
direction in which the rules and techniques of international law appear
to be moving.
Definitions and Assumptions
The international law we are concerned with here is understood in
a broad sense; it includes legal rules derived from all of the traditional
sources: customs, bilateral and multilateral treaties, writings of scholars
and general principles of law. To limit the meaning of international
law in the present context to customary law alone would be not only
unduly restrictive but also highly unrealistic. International treaties, for
instance, are today the chief tools for the development of the law;? their
study is essential to a complete description of existing international law
rules and also provides valuable indications of possible future developments.
The "third world" is a vividly descriptive and perhaps tendentious
term, less commonly used in the United States3 than in Europe. There
is some disagreement as to its precise meaning. Some writers use it to
refer to the "new" states of Africa and Asia, without including Latin
America. 4 Others extend its meaning to include all those states which
-basically by reason of the stage of their economic development, but
also because of differences in culture, tradition, current political regime
and national interests-aie distinct from both the economically developed states of the West and the developed or semi-developed states
of the Soviet bloc.5 The latter is the meaning adopted for the purposes
of this article. Geographically, then, the third world includes most of
the Asian, African, and Latin American states. There is no total cohe2. On the role of international treaties in current international relations as "an essential
instrument for the renewal of the law," see DE VisscHER, TrIomEs ETr RMAMTS EN DROIT
iNTERNATIO NAL P BLIC 198-99 (3d ed. 1960); De Visscher, Coutwne et traiti en droit
internationalpublic, 59 Rv. Giti~RLE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc 353, 359-66 (1955).
3. But see Rossi, TIm THmI WoRLD (1963).
4. See, e.g., id. at 4-5.
5. This may perhaps be considered the "correct" or more widely used meaning of
the term. See LE TIERS MONDE-SOUS-D-VELOPPEMENT ET DEVELOPPEXIENT (Balandier ed.
1956).
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sion among its members; their policies often diverge, but they tend on
the whole to follow similar lines with respect to a number of important
topics.
Since this article deals with the influence of the third world on international law, the majority of the problems of the cold war will not be
considered. The cold war, being one of the two most important facts
of contemporary international life, cannot be ignored in examining any
aspect of international relations. It lies always in the background of our
consciousness, beyond the "horizon" of immediate concern. Without
in the least ignoring its importance, however, it is possible and necessary
to leave its problems aside while examining our present topic. Cold war
issues will be studied only to the extent that they are directly relevant to
the problems at hand. Such treatment also involves the assumption that
the cold war will remain static, that new developments in the relations
between the West and the Soviet bloc or within the blocs themselves
will not affect the situation of the third world or its relations with the
two blocs. It needs neither great perspicacity nor special sources of
information to realize that, however necessary for the purposes of the
present study, this is a highly unrealistic assumption. It is therefore to
be seen as a major implied qualification to all statements or findings.
It has become evident already that this paper will not be limited to
strictly legal questions and that it will deal in part with political and
economic matters. No apology is needed for this. Any study of legal
change must deal with the political and other forces involved. Lawmaking is a political process, and, particularly with respect to international law, any attempt to ignore political and economic elements
would lead to obviously meaningless results. While taking into consideration the substantive non-legal factors, however, the present paper
attempts to deal in the main with international law; political and other
elements are considered only to the extent necessary to understand the
international legal problems and developments involved.
The Reasons for Change
In recent years international law has expanded phenomenally, essentially in two directions. First, the number of its subjects has increased;6
6. We are chiefly concerned here with states as subjects of international law; we do
not discuss, therefore, the problems arising out of the increasing role of other new
subjects, such as international organizations, or quasi subjects, such as individuals and
international companies. This is a significant limitation on the scope of the present
inquiry, for such subjects play a most important role in current international affairs. See
Friedmann, The Changing Dimensions of International Law, 62 COLtM. L. REv. 1147,
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the international legal order is now, for the first time, really universal,
and it includes, on an equal footing, almost all distinct human communities on the globe.7 Second, the scope of international law has greatly
expanded as to subject matter; it now regulates, in whole or in part, a
great number of topics which either did not exist in the past (nuclear
energy, space law) or were left to the exclusive jurisdiction of the individual states (especially economic matters). This expansion in scope is
directly revelant to the interests and concerns of the third world. In
view of the extent of the expansion, there would have been a need for
changes in existing legal rules even if all the present members of the
international society were similar to one another in culture, interests,
mentality and stage of economic development. The fact that they are
not, and the presence of important differences between the older and
the new members of the world community is an additional compelling
reason for international legal change.
The most important of these differences, and the one bound to play
a significant role in fashioning the "new" international law, is that between the stages of economic growth of the old and the new states.
The "underdevelopment" of the third world is a basic factor which
leads to an extensive, though by no means total, divergence of the national interests of the new and the old states. The nations of the third
world aspire to a rapid economic development that will consummate
their recently acquired political independence. Economic development,
in this sense, is a shorthand way of referring to a process that is economic
only in part, and which involves social, economic, political and even
cultural and psychological change. The same process, seen from the
political and cultural rather than the economic angle, is sometimes described under another name: that of "decolonization." Thus, in a
thoughtful short essay, the Tunisian Minister of Planning points out
that "decolonization must not be the reverse process of colonization.
Decolonization must signify, to start with, a profound revolution of
mental, moral, social and economic structures." ' Political revolution
1155-62 (1962); Reuter, Principes de droit internationalpublic, 103 HAGUE REcUEIL 425,
586-90 (1961).
7. The profound originality of the element of equality should be stressed. Though

inequalities of power retain their importance, this is the first time in history that
virtually all distinct human communities are at least presumptively treated as equal, in
the legal as well as the social and moral sense. However precarious the presumption,
it represents a definite improvement over the past.
8. Ben Salah, Significations et perspectives de la dicolonisation, 25 L'EsPRIT 891
(1957).
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and the independence that follows are not ends in themselves, they are
only means. Decolonization itself is only a provisional end; it, too,
must "transcend itself toward permanent values." Seen in this light,
the process of decolonization is not limited to "an operation at the level
of governments and of the administrative machinery. . . . It implies a
transformation of man and of the conditions in which he lives." 9
The third world's quest for economic development cannot but affect
the structure of the international society and the substance of the rules
which govern relations among states. Political and economic development in the new states depend to a large extent on the attitude and assistance of the older and more developed states. 10 At the same time, the
needs of their political and economic development often prompt the
new nations to act in a manner detrimental to the immediate interests
of the developed countries. The need for assistance and understanding
on the part of those who, in the short run at least, may be injured by
the development of the assisted (whatever the long-range effects may
be), is one of the basic contradictions of the present international scene.
It is obviously a situation where the development of appropriate legal
rules could be of great assistance in apportioning gains and injuries and
permitting a continuing process of collaboration between the participants.
Whether the cultural differences between the third world and the
nations of either bloc will be of decisive importance in determining
the extent and content of the impending changes in international law
is a matter of considerable controversy. It is argued, on the one side,
that international law has been the creation of a Western European
society of states at a certain stage of its development, and that it is,
therefore, founded on Western European culture, characterized by
Christianity, a Greco-Roman past, and a respect for rationality expressed
in political and legal ideas." Yet the majority of the nations of the
9. Id. at 892; cf. Tour6, Africa's Future and the World, 41 FoRFIG- AFFAIRS 141, 143
(1962). "[T]he struggle for independence . . . had just one meaning for the African

peoples: to acquire the first tool to open the way for them to solve their problems as
human beings fully conscious of their responsibilities." Ibid. But, however inadequate,
political independence is no mean achievement: "[Tihe worst decolonization will always
be superior by far to the best colonization. The difference between decolonization and
colonization is not a matter of degree .... " Csaire, L'hovmie de culture et ses responsabilitigs, 1959 PMIsENcE AFRiCAIvE No. 25-26 (N.S.), 116, 118.

10. Economic aid is the prime example of the type of action needed, but other kinds
of economic and political action are also necessary.
11. See, e.g., Scheuner, Ius Gentium and the Present Developmnent of International
Law, in VOLRENRECMTELIJKE OPsTELL N (Festschrift Van der Molen) 123 (1962); Verzijl,
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third world have a different cultural background. Their religious tradidons, whether Buddhist, Confucian, Moslem or pagan, differ radically
from the Christian; their political and legal ideas are different, and
philosophically they place less reliance on rationalism.
The argument on the other side, to the effect that the cultural differences between the European nations and the new states are of little,
if any, relevance to present-day international law, is, in our view, far
more realistic and convincing. This position has been succinctly stated
as follows:
Despite all the difference in religious, cultural, and historical background, the traditional attitude of the major centers of Asian civilization with regard to international politics and law has not been
markedly different from that of their Middle Eastern or European
counterparts. Further, whatever the differences may have been in
the past, the facts of modern state organization and international life
have completely overshadowed any traditional differences of outlook
and philosophy. The representatives of Asian values have become
modern nation states, of greater or lesser power, organized on the lines
developed by the European nations in previous centuries, and seeking
to realize national aspirations. In doing so they are subjected to the
same tensions between international community interests, reflected in
international law, and national aspirations, reflected in the power
politics of states. 12
The United Nations is perhaps the most obvious example of an institution created on the basis of "Western" legal ideas and now being successfully utilized by the non-Western members of the third world.
Still, it would be too much to argue that the difference between
the cultural backgrounds of the new nations and those of the Western
states is of no significance whatever. Each nation sees its interests not
only from a specific standpoint which can be objectively determined,
Western European Influence on the Foundation of International Law, 1 INTERNATIONAL
REATIONS 137 (1955); Wright, Asian Experience and International Law, 1 INTERNATIONAL
SruDms7l (1959).
12. Friedmann, The Position of Underdeveloped Countries and the Universality of
International Law, 2 COLUMBIA SOC'Y INTERNATIONAL L. BuLL. 5 (1963). See also JENKS,
THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 106, 109, 120-67, 169-72 (1958); SYATAUw, SOME NWLY
ESTABuSHED ASIAN STATES AND TiE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 225-34 passim
(1961); Abi-Saab, The Newly Independent States and the Rules of International Law:
An Outline, 8 How. L.J. 95, 99-101 (1962); Anand, RdIe of the "New" Asian-African
Countries in the Present InternationalLegal Order,56 AM. J. INT'L L. 383 (1962); Friedmann, supra note 6, at 1147, 1150-53.
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but also through its own peculiar spectacles, whose exact coloring and
focus is determined by the cultural, political and other background of
that nation. An ex-slave (or ex-colonial subject) does not see his exmaster in an "objective" manner, i.e., in the same light as others (presumably not ex-slaves) would see him. Whether in love, respect, hate,
or all three, his perception of the ex-master is different. What is true of
the perception of objects holds true of the understanding of concepts
or norms. The process is not exclusively emotional; intellectual familiarity with or knowledge of a concept or rule may have the same effect:
an expert's conception of a medical or commercial term is by no means
the same as that of the layman. Culture, as part of a recent historical
background, will then influence the manner in which the rulers of the
new nations will conceive their national interests and the character or
effect of the revelant international law norms. But it should be stressed
that, in addition to culture or religion, several other elements combine to
form the basic background which influences a nation's mentality and
perception.
The cultural background of the new nations of Africa or Asia may
influence international law in another way, too. Nearly all of these
nations adopted initially, upon acquiring independence, the political
systems of the West. In many cases, the Western political models have
by now suffered greater or smaller changes and have taken peculiar
forms, and this trend will probably continue. For instance, the singleparty system is in many, though not all, cases a bona fide attempt to
construct a new kind of political regime, which is certainly influenced
by Western models, democratic and otherwise, but deviates, in form
as well as in substance, in order to conform to, and take advantage of,
existing forms of social and political order.'3 This is an experiment
which may ultimately fail, but, if it is successful, the new political forms
and methods that will develop will probably affect the techniques and
the structures of international law.
Finally, cultural traditions may also be of some importance in particular situations, when their effect happens to coincide with the needs of
the promotion of the new states' interests. Thus, certain techniques used
in international relations may fit well both the cultural predilections and
the rational pursuit of interests of some of the new states. This may
13. See AFRICAN ONF-PARTY STATmS (Carter ed. 1962); THr POLITICS OF T=E DEVELOPAREAs 40-42, 551 et seq. (Almond & Coleman ed. 1960). For representative statements by African leaders, see M. Keita, Le parti unique en Afrique, 1960 PRiSENCE
AFRICAINE No. 30 (N.S.) 3; MBOYA, FaEDOM AND A1FrmR 83-88 (1963).
nsG
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be true, for instance, of the use of techniques of conciliation, rather
than adjudication, for the settlement of disputes. But in such cases, it
would be surely incorrect to attribute the preference for such techniques
to cultural factors only.
Certain additional elements of the present day international situation
are also of importance in determining the extent to which international
law will be affected by the emergence of the third world. First, war
has become today unacceptable as an instrument of large scale legal
change. It is not necessary to enter into the discussion of to what extent
war is "unthinkable," illegal, or impossible. What is important for our
purposes is that, though armed force may still be used occasionally,
with or without success, limitations, not so much formally legal as
pragmatic, are increasingly imposed on its use. 14 Traditional international law, however, developed at a time when war was possible as
a last, and not necessarily uncommon, resort, and when its legality was
not seriously questioned. The use or threat of armed force was an accepted method of coercing states into paying their debts, treating aliens
fairly or, more often, granting them privileges, or into political or economic dependence upon the Great Powers. In most cases today, force
cannot be effectively used or threatened to achieve such aims, whether
legitimate or illegal. There arises, therefore, a need for changes in the
specific rules and the general structure of international law to adjust
it to the new reality of relative warlessness.
The existence of limitations on the use of force for the pursuit of
national interests generally favors the economically and militarily
weaker states and is thus in the interest of the third world. 15 Its
members are today in a position to act much 'more freely than the
weaker states of fifty years ago. There is even a danger that the abusive
exploitation of this freedom will intensify the existing international instability.' However, the extent of the third world's freedom of action,
in this as in other respects, should not be exaggerated. Many other
14. For an exhaustive recent study along traditional lines, see BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UsE oF FORCE BY STATES (1963) (especially the conclusions at
431-36). See also McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION (1961).
15. This is true with respect to the relationship between the third world and the
older states of the Western or the Soviet bloc. The stronger members of the third
world, however, may not favor such limitations to the extent that they limit their
freedom of action toward their neighbors.
16. See STONE, QUEST FOR SUvrAL 41-44 (1961); Stone, A Comnon Law for Mankind?, 2 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 414, 429-32 (1960); of. BROWNLE, Op. Cit. supra note 14,
at 289-301.
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methods of pressure and persuasion, apart from the threat of armed
action, are available to the major powers. Moreover, the presence of
international organizations diminishes significantly the threat of in-

stability.
Another factor favoring the increased influence of the third world on
international law is that, under present conditions, this group is the one
that has the most to gain from the establishment of a relatively stable
international legal order through the elaboration of legal, rather than

purely political, methods and channels. 17 The protagonists of the cold
war cannot expect to gain much from the substitution of legal for

political methods. Each is generally capable of protecting its vital interests

through political or economic methods and cannot expect great immediate gains from the increased use of legal channels. The states belonging
to the third world are individually in a much weaker position. Their
main defense is the invocation of the danger of utter chaos or of nuclear
escalation. But even that is of little avail where the state concerned
cannot rely on the support of other members of the third world or on
the concern of one of the major powers. By and large, therefore, it is
to the interest of the third world states, as it has always been in the
interest of the weaker, to strengthen the international legal order and
promote the use of legal channels in interstate relations. This does not
mean that the third world either desires or is prepared to strengthen the
status quo in the present international society. On the contrary, its
members want change, preferably peaceful and, if possible, legal-change
of the factual situations through change of the legal rules concerning
them. In achieving such change, however, it is clearly in their longrange interest to avoid weakening the international legal order.1
17. See Abi-Saab, supra note 12, at 99; Castafieda, The Underdeveloped Nations and
the Development of International Law, 15 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 38, 41 (1961);
Lissitzyn, InternationalLaw in a Divided Vorld, Int'l Conc., March 1963, p. 65.
18. A legal order, be it national or international, operates essentially only in the
presence of a general consensus among those who are subject to it. The content of this
consensus is not necessarily that the particular legal order is the best possible; nor
does the presence of a consensus imply a general agreement as to the values sought or
sanctioned by the order. The necessary consensus is merely the conviction that it is
to the interest (material, spiritual or whatever) of the subjects to obey the law and not
to disturb the legal order. If a general agreement as to values exists, then the subjects
may uphold the legal order because they value the ends it pursues. But even where
such agreement is lacking, fear of coercion, religious beliefs, respect for tradition,
ignorance, emotional drives or a dislike for disorder may keep the legal order in operation. When it becomes obvious to the subjects that their interests are better served
by the dissolution of the existing order (whether it is to be followed by disorder or
by a different legal order) that order will not survive. These considerations are fully
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In this connection, the eagerness of the new states to participate
actively in the life of the international society should be noted. Upon
the declaration of its independence, each new state has established a
foreign affairs ministry and a diplomatic service, however rudimentary,
almost before any other major department of government. All of the
new states have asked immediately for admission to the United Nations,
and most of them have quickly established a considerable number of
embassies and legations abroad. Of the approximately eighty states in
the United Nations which may be said to belong to the third world,
all have established embassies or legations in the United States, and over
sixty have done so in the United Kingdom and in France." Within the
United Nations most of the new states have generally been very active;
those that have not yet attempted to play an international role (for instance, Algeria after independence) are few. At the same time, the
new states have supported projects for the improvement of their own
knowledge of international law: for example, the United Nations' recently inaugurated programs for the teaching of international law.20 It
is also characteristic that most of the topics with which the Asian
African Legal Consultative Committee has been concerned are traditional and relatively noncontroversial questions such as sovereign immunity, diplomatic privileges, extradition and recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments.2 '
In many cases, the international activity of new states precedes their
independence. International conferences and meetings of international
organizations are often effectively used by the representatives of revolutionary parties or governments to hasten the independence of their
territories. The Algerian question was thus internationalized in fact
long before Algeria itself became a formally recognized independent
state.22 Similarly, the presence of many delegations of colonial terriapplicable to the international legal order. It can exist effectively only when the
states (and their citizens) are convinced that their interests are better served by its
existence.
19. See 1963-I EuROPA YEARBOOK 444-45, 553; 1964 WORLD ALMANAC 63-64. See
generally Quermonne, Les engagements internationaux des nouveaux itats, in LES
NOUVEAUX ETATS DANS LES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES 323, 329-34 (Duroselle & Meyriat
ed. 1962).
20. See U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 1816 (XVII), December 18, 1962.
21. See the summary of the Committee's activities since 1956, in ASIAN AFRICAN
LEGAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, FOURTH SEssIoN, TOKYO, 1961, REPORT OF THE SEssION
5-9, 15-17, passim (1961).
22. On the ihternational aspects of the Algerian war, see BEDJAOUi, LAW AND THE
ALGEMAN REVOLUTION 110-38 (1961), and the comments in ANNUAiRE FRANgAIS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL by Charpentier: La reconnaissancedu G.P.R.A., 5 ANNUAiRE 799 (1959);
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tories in the Bandung Conference served to make evident and to
strengthen the Afro-Asian movement toward independence. The phenomenon was not unknown in the past, but its high incidence is quite
recent, for today's increased pace of international activity gives greater
importance and effectiveness to such limited participation of prospective
states and governments in international life.
There are many reasons for the emphasis that the new states place
on their international role. It is tempting to explain it in psychological
or emotional terms: the newly liberated elites wish to mimic their exmasters, to enjoy international prestige and to cling to the external signs
of independence, while ignoring the difficult and painful realities.2 No
doubt, there is some validity to such explanations, but there is much
more to these policies than mere vanity or emotionalism. The development of "parliamentary diplomacy" has given the weaker states the
opportunity to express themselves in the international forum, and it has
thus given them a certain limited, but no less real, power to influence
decisions. The nuclear stalemate has led to a downgrading of the importance of military power as a prerequisite for "responsible statehood."
It can be said of many of the new states that they survive only because
of their formal statehood. Their leaders realize that their chief means
for discouraging direct or indirect attacks on their territorial integrity
is to become active and "known" on the international scene. But in
addition to such defensive motives, participation in international life,
meaning largely participation in international organizations, has an important positive function. The development of an "international law
of cooperation" 24 makes such participation rewarding in many ways.
Indeed, nonparticipation or exclusion is today a much feared sanction
which serves to enforce the standards and rules enacted by international
organizations. 0 All in all, the international dimension of states has become today far more important, rationally as well as emotionally, than
ever before.2 0
La France et le G.P.R.A., 7 ANNUAIRE 855 (1961), and by Flory: Alg~rie et droit international, 5 ANNUAIRE 817 (1959); Algdrie algdrienne et droit international,6 ANNUARIE

973 (1960); Nigociation ou digagement en Algirie, 7 ANNUAIRE 836 (1961); La fin de la
souveraineti franfaise en Algdrie, 8 ANNUAIRE 905 (1962). And for an excellent summary
of the practices and problems of the building-up of diplomatic relations before independence, see, Quermonne, supra note 19, at 326-29.
23. See, e.g., Quermonne, supra note 19, at 348-52.
24. See FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 460-61, 475-81 (1959); Friedmann,
supra note 6, at 1162-65.
25. See Friedmann, National Sovereignty, International Cooperation, and the Reality
of InternationalLaw, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 739, 747-53 (1963).
26. It is true that, in the past as well, some of the weaker states have participated
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The third world's participation in international life differs in one
respect from the corresponding activities of Western states. In the
Western European and North American states, there is extensive private
activity and participation in international affairs through nongovernmental organizations and associations. Such private concern appears
to be lacking in the African and most of the Asian states, where only the
government and the official groups and agencies (including trade unions
2
and professional associations) are involved in international activities. 7
This is probably due to the acuteness of the domestic problems, the
lack of a tradition in this field and, in some cases, to the limited participation of the bulk of the population in public life. The limitation of
most international contacts to the governmental or official level creates
serious problems of communication.
The Power of Impotence
It is not enough to show that there exist certain compelling reasons
for legal change. Certain objective conditions making possible legal
changes desired by the third world must also be shown to exist. Such
conditions do exist today. This may seem paradoxical, at first glance,
for it is obvious that the power of the third world in military, economic
or political terms is minimal. The fact is that the main source of political
strength for the third world is precisely its military, economic and
political weakness. The chief pragmatic consideration that induces developed states to make concessions on legal, political or economic matters
to the underdeveloped nations is that, if concessions are not made, if a
certain minimum movement toward economic development and decolonization does not start soon, the present instability will reach such
proportions that it will result in political and economic, not to mention
legal, chaos. Such a development would be in no one's interest, if only
because it would tend to make the rivalry between the two blocs even
more acute and thus render war, with its connotation of nuclear catastrophe, more probable.
A closely related consideration, the significance of which cannot be
actively in international life, for reasons probably similar to those noted in the text.
This was true, for instance, at the turn of the century, of several Latin American states
and of the economically underdeveloped Eastern and Southern European states. On
the other hand, it was certainly not true of the few independent African and Asian
states, with the exception of Japan. See Castafieda, supra note 17, at 38-40; RoNNING,

(1963).
27. See Gerber, Les nouveaux itats et les organisations internationales, in LES
NouvEAUX kTATS DANS LES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES 447, 478-80 (Duroselle & Meyriat
ed. 1962).

LAW AND POLITICS IN INTER-AmERmcAN DIPLOMACY
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overstressed, is the presence of the cold war. Individually or as a group,
the nations of the third world are in a position to bargain with the
developed countries by threatening to join, or to become more closely
related with, one of the two blocs. In fact, the importance of the third
world increased considerably from the moment, after the death of Stalin,
that the Soviet Union and its allies decided to consider neutralist or nonaligned nations not as potential. enemies, as they more or less had before,
but as potential friends.25 Under present conditions, the overwhelming
concern of the United States and the Soviet Union with the cold war,
and the continuing interpretation of international events in terms of that
concern, provide a useful bargaining tool to the third world. This attitude is not necessarily cynical or irresponsible. It corresponds to the
third world's basic refusal to accept the cold war as the only or even as
the most important factor in international relations, disagreeing here
with most governments and academic commentators within the two
blocs. From its point of view, international economic development is
far more important than the struggle for domination between two substantially developed power blocs and two largely alien and seemingly
irrelevant ideologies. Thus, the third world nations consider their bargaining with the two blocs as beneficial to the international society as
a whole, since it tends to restore some balance in international relations.
However, this bargaining is occasionally pushed too far and acts as an
additional element of instability rather than as a stabilizing force.20
On an economic plane, the third world as a whole possesses certain
other means for exercising pressure to promote its interests. Its members
are today the chief sources of raw materials necessary to the economies
of the developed nations.30 Individual countries can normally use this
to exert pressure to a limited extent only, but, here also, the cold war
enhances their bargaining power. The concerted action of several such
states could be even more effective. There have been no clear instances
of this sort of concerted action, but the possibility definitely does exist.
Some of the third world leaders are obviously trying to promote such
action, while the Western states and the private companies concerned
are, somewhat less openly, trying to avoid it.3" The presence and opera28. See DALLIN, THE SoviET UNION AT THE UNITED NATIONS 37-41, 58-59, 116-19 (1962).
29. See SToN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 98; Kaplan, Bipolarity in a Revolutionary
POLITIcS 251, 262-66 (Kaplan ed. 1962).
Vorld, in THE REVOLUTION IN WNVORLD

30. This seems to be, at the moment, more valid with respect to the W*estern countries than with respect to the Soviet bloc, though Soviet imports from the third world
also consist predominantly of primary products.
MI. Since the establishment of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries,
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don of Western private companies in many of the third world states is
another element which strengthens, to some extent, the position of these
states vis-a-vis the developed ones. The foreign enterprises are, from one
point of view, "hostages" of the local government. The threat of a
taking or of interference with their operation is a consideration that
must be taken seriously into account by the foreign offices of Western
states. Nevertheless, the effective use of such pressure by the host states
is severely restricted because of the need for more foreign capital, public
and private, and because of the possible use by the developed nations
or the companies involved of several methods of effective pressure.
There have been cases where foreign enterprises were the victims of unsuccessful bargaining or attempts by either side to exercise pressure, but
in most instances where such enterprises have been seriously affected by
governmental measures, it was not bargaining of this sort but other
considerations (economic, nationalistic, etc.) that were predominantly
operative. Finally, the third world countries are actual or potential
markets for exports from the rest of the world. Especially in the context of the cold war, this gives them an opportunity to promote their
interests through bargaining on commercial matters.
Pragmatic considerations are not the only elements which have to be
weighed. Certain other objective conditions exist which are of importance, though they may not be capable of being stated in quantitative
terms or in terms of economic self-interest. The claims of the third
world, fo begin with, often have a moral persuasiveness which undoubtedly affects the attitude of the developed countries. One need not
be "moralistic" to realize that such factors play an important role in
international affairs, perhaps more today than in the past. The extent to
which the third world attributes responsibility for its present condition
to colonialism or to other past actions and attitudes of the Western
powers may often be exaggerated, but there remains enough truth in the
charge to provoke hot denials by the West; these denials are an indication of the relevance of the moral element, even though they do not
prove the validity of the charges. It is not suggested that states will
sacrifice their vital interests to atone for past crimes, even if admitted;
the moral element is rarely, if ever, a controlling factor in international
relations. It remains, nonetheless, a consideration, the importance of
which should not be ignored.
A related consideration of limited, yet real, value is that of "world
recent developments in the petroleum industry can be profitably interpreted in this
manner.
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public opinion." While it is certainly true that there is no strict definition of this factor, that it can be manipulated by propaganda, and that
2
states seldom bow to its dictates when important interests are involved,
nevertheless, something that can be referred to by this term does play
a marginal but undeniable role in today's international affairs. For many
reasons, including the expansion of the international society, the increased role and efficacy of communications, and the ideological context
of the cold war, states and governments are seriously concerned with
their "image" abroad. Although no state is prepared to sacrifice its vital
interests merely in order to obey an indefinite and partly artificial world
public opinion, decisions on minor matters may be affected, and these
often have a cumulative importance. The preservation of a favorable
public opinion abroad, among governments as well as private individuals,
is treated today as one of the elements of the national interest. Since
the attitude of the third world is a significant element of world public
opinion, the older nations do consider it; it is, therefore, another source
of power for the third world states.
A Digression on Method
It has been desirable to discuss the reasons why the emergence of the
third world renders changes in traditional international law necessary
and to describe the objective conditions making such changes practically
possible; but the existence of the need can hardly be challenged. It is
more difficult, however, to determine in concrete terms the actual substance of the impending developments. This is where imagination,
speculation and prophecy enter. Although it is not possible to achieve
a high degree of precision in predictions, something more than vague
generalities can be ventured. Indications of existing trends and movements may be found, and, even though the final effects remain obscure
and undetermined, we may indicate the direction in which they are
moving and study the problems raised.
The materials on which descriptions and predictions can be based
are still limited. Up to a few years ago the majority of the recognized
members of the world community were relatively old states. The
poorer, and in many cases younger, states then in existence were far
less important and, therefore, far less vocal than they are today. 33 But
the whole context of the world community and the very atmosphere
of international affairs has changed so radically, that the events and
32. See NIORGENTHAU, POLITIcS AMONG NATIONS 260-71 (3d ed. 1960).
33. But see note 26 supra.

Virginia Law ReviewV

[Vol. 50:783

attitudes of the past can be considered only as the background or the
prehistory of present developments, not really as part of them. The
impact of the third world is very new, and developments and attitudes
have had no time to crystallize and become manifest. Furthermore, it is
difficult to determine with any precision the present attitudes and
policies of many states belonging to the third world. The difficulties
of obtaining documentation, a perennial problem for the international
lawyer, are much more acute in the case of the third world. Moreover,
in many cases, the states in question have had no opportunity to direct
their attention to particular rules or principles because no specific problems have arisen. More important, most of the states concerned are
faced with a scarcity of international law experts to advise them and to
elaborate in technical terms the state's approach to international law
and to specific international rules. This is less of a problem with some
of the older states belonging to this group, for instance, the Latin
American states.
In addition to the writings of jurists who have dealt with the problems
discussed here, two, or rather three, main sources of information and
inspiration have been used. First, in view of the importance attributed
to the factor of underdevelopment (or the "debtor" position), the past
practices and attitudes of the older "debtor" countries have been found
to be relevant and useful. Second, the debates and activities within the
United Nations and its various organs and agencies have been a rich
source of indications and statements concerning the questions we are
dealing with. In fact, this is too rich a source, and the present paper only
skims the surface of the available material. The third source, if it may
properly be so termed, upon which this article is based, is more difficult
to define. It may be called speculation or, perhaps, imagination. If one
takes as given certain objective conditions and attitudes, including the
pursuit of certain goals and the resulting conflicts of national interests, and if the "theories and realities" of contemporary international
law are taken into consideration, it is possible to reach certain specific
conclusions with respect to the probable claims and attitudes of the
third world, the probable reactions of the rest of the world and the
probable grounds of compromise and agreement. These conclusions
can be checked against the available evidence, and their total effect upon
traditional international law norms can be assessed.
The concrete effects of the emergence of the third world on the
whole body of international law cannot be explored in a single article.
Accordingly, attention is focused here on a branch of the law where,
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amid much controversy, considerable change has been taking placethe law governing the economic relations between states and between
states and foreign traders and investors.
InternationalLaw and Economic Development
One of the difficulties in trying to visualize the developing international law is the limiting effect of existing classifications and subdivisions of the "fields" or "branches" of public international law. When
dealing with certain specific topics, therefore, it is necessary to consider
whether shifting some sets of rules from one "branch" to another or
setting up new branches may be of assistance in clarifying the issues and
facilitating the search for solutions. In approaching the problems which
arise in connection with economic relations with the nations of the
third world, we shall start by drawing an analogy, setting up a hypothetical state and looking at the problems at hand in the context of a
state's domestic politics."' We may thus be able to see better the substantive problems without allowing the formal classification of legal
rules or concepts to obscure the real issues. Vhile the similarity between
the national and international situations is not complete, it is essential not
to ignore the underlying identity of the basic problems as manifested
in the national and the international contexts. It should be clear, especially at this particular moment in the United States, that the problems
of economic development and of its preconditions and effects are closely
related to the need to assure the effective participation of all members
of a community in the community's economic and political processes.
In today's United States the civil rights movement and the "war against
poverty" are manifestations of the same basic realization. They are
attempts to resolve the same basic problems that, on the international
34. Use of a hypothetical situation is dictated by the need to simplify the issues and
to avoid the qualifications and reservations necessary if an analogy to certain concrete
historical situations were to be drawn. The present condition of the international
society has been rightly compared to that of the national societies of the Western
European states at the turn of the century. The present position of the third world in
the international setting bears a definite resemblance to that of the working class in
late nineteenth century Western European national societies. See R6mLG, INRNATIONAL
LAw IN AN FxPANDED Woam 56-67 (1960). This is a perceptive and useful analogy, as
long as it is treated as such. It becomes misleading when an attempt is made to use it
as the basis for an interpretation of the present world situation in terms of Marxist
"class struggle." The resulting picture of the world community as a society where the
capitalist Western countries are the "ruling class" and the third world the "proletariat"
is so inaccurate and leaves so much unexplained and unprovided for, even in Marxist
terms, that it lacks any real usefulness. See EmERSON, FROM EMPIRE To NATION 181-82
(1960).
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scale, the United Nations and the individual states are trying to deal
with through international economic aid, the promotion of international
economic development and the encouragement of peaceful change.
Suppose then that in an isolated, unevenly developed country, the
"oppressed classes" have finally managed to emancipate themselves,
within the framework of the existing legal order. And assume further
that the old "ruling class" retains its economic power, though its political
power has been curtailed. What, in terms of law reform, would be the
claims or desires of the previously oppressed classes at the time of their
emancipation? First, they would want to be rid of past debts and obligations which they have had to enter into when still not free. Second,
they would want to be able to earn a living wage under fair working
conditions. Third, they would want to protect themselves against possible future oppression through economic exploitation. Fourth, they would
seek the initiation of a "crash program" of public assistance to make
possible the education of their children and to assure them of tolerable
living conditions. Fifth, they would seek to have some provision made
for the discharge or modification of those obligations and debts which
were contracted after emancipation, but before the members of the
classes concerned had acquired enough economic power to be able to
bargain on an equal basis. It is evident that through these claims the
newly emancipated classes would be seeking both to give substance to
their new political position and to assure that economic pressures would
not drive them back under oppression. Each set of claims is different
from the others and at the same time is complementary to them.
In the international context, these claims (obviously those of the
third world) are both more familiar and more complex. One important
new variable has to be introduced, namely, the distinction between
public and private interests and bodies, for traditional international law
distinguishes sharply between claims of a state against other states and
claims directed against private persons. Moreover, the claims enumerated above would be treated under different headings and as belonging
to distinct branches of international law. The first set of claims would
be considered in the law of state succession; the fifth in the law of
treaties and the law of state responsibility; the second, third and fourth
sets of claims would be regarded as formally irrelevant to general customary international law and proper subjects for treatment under treatymade law.
It is to be expected that the third world countries that have recently
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become independent would wish to rid themselves of the obligations
imposed on them prior to their independence or, at least, to be given
an opportunity to decide whether they wish to be bound by these obligations. In traditional international law, the solution depends essentially
on whether the obligation has been undertaken toward other states or
toward private persons. "Without attempting to summarize the law of
state succession, it is fair to say that with respect to obligations toward
other countries, the new state has a considerable margin of freedom
and flexibility. Though neither theory nor state practice are fully consistent and no full investigation of recent state practice has yet been
made,- it seems clear that, with some exceptions (e.g., treaties relating
to boundary questions), the successor state can, at the very least, "pick
and choose" among the treaties concluded by its predecessor to decide
which will continue in force. The present trend is definitely toward
increased flexibility, but with some concern for avoiding measures
that might strongly prejudice the stability of the legal order. Most new
states do not declare that they are not bound by treaties concluded by
the colonial power, but do state that they reserve the right to repudiate
them, or that the treaties remain in force during a certain period of
time only until new arrangements can be made.36 The great need today
is not so much for a change of the relevant legal rules, as for an orderly
legal procedure through which the position of the successor states can
be made clear within a relatively short time. Such a procedure does
exist with respect to membership in international organizations and to
certain multilateral conventions. The secretariats of international organizations play a preponderant role in inducing states to clarify their
intentions on these matters. 37
35. The International Law Commission is currently studying this topic and is expected to review such recent practice. A special subcommittee has already settled on an
outline of the problems to be included in the report of the Special Rapporteur. See
U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/160 (1963). Several interesting and informative memoranda, by
the U.N. Secretariat and by members of the subcommittee, have already been prepared. See U.N. Docs. Nos. A/CN.4/157(1963), A/CN.4/150(1962), A/CN.4/151(1962),
A/CN.4/149(1962).
36. See, e.g., Statement by the Prime Minister of Tanganyika before the Tanganyika
National Assembly, Nov. 30, 1961, in 11 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 1210 (1962); Declaration
by the Prime Minister of Tanganyika to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
Dec. 9, 1961, in U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/160, Annex II, App. (1963).
37. Thus, when each new state gains its independence, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations addresses to it an inquiry concerning its succession to multilateral
treaties entered into by the predecessor state to which the United Nations is depository,
and he requests a notification by the head of state or Foreign Minister regarding the
devolution of these treaty obligations. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/150, at 45-46
(1962).
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Difficult questions arise regarding the so-called "acquired rights" of
private persons. With few exceptions, the traditional rule is that the
successor state is bound to respect such rights. However useful or valid
in the past, the distinction between public and private law rights is today
losing much of its relevance.as The extent of state intervention in economic and social affairs is such that the rights of private persons are
normally bound to be affected extensively and frequently, while, in the
new nations, the drive for economic development adds to the importance
of the state's role. The continuing validity of rights of a private or semiprivate character, which were granted or made possible by the predecessor state, constitutes a significant limitation on the new state's freedom to
pursue effectively the methods of rapid economic development it may
prefer. It is more realistic, then, to allow greater flexibility to the new
state. In the future, the resulting problems will probably be dealt with on
a government-to-government basis, along lines similar to those more or
less accepted in the case of intergovernmental obligations. 39 The objective, in both cases, is to assure a minimum of stability while allowing the
new state as much freedom as possible in handling its own affairs.
The problems which arise when a state attempts to free itself from
obligations undertaken, with its own consent, at a time when it was at
least formally independent are often similar in substance. An important
difference exists, however, namely, the fact that the obligations were not
undertaken by another power acting by virtue of colonial conquest
but by the state itself.40 This may be a somewhat technical consideration
38. See Friedmann, The Uses of "General Principles" in the Development of International Law, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 279, 281-85 (1963). Compare Jones, The Rule of Law
and the Welfare State, 58 CoLuM. L. REv. 143 (1958).
39. During the debates on permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the
Second Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in December 1962, Algeria
proposed an amendment to the draft resolution to the effect that international law obligations "cannot apply to alleged rights acquired before accession to full sovereignty of
formerly colonized countries," and that, consequently, such "alleged acquired rights"
must be subject to review as between equally sovereign states. The amendment was later
withdrawn, in favor of another amendment, proposed by the United States and the
United Kingdom, to the effect that the provision of the resolution on the conditions
for the legality of expropriations of property in no way
prejudices the position of any Member State on any aspect of the question of
the rights and obligations of successor States and Governments in respect of
property acquired before the accession to complete sovereignty of countries
formerly under colonial rule.
U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 1803 (XVII), December 14, 1962. See also note 42 infra.
40. An intermediate situation which cannot be examined here in detail is the case
where the new state undertakes certain general or specific obligations toward the excolonial state by virtue of a treaty or constitutional enactment at the time of independence. It is not yet clear how far such instruments are binding on the new state.
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since the state may have been at the time, in fact or in its retrospective
view of the matter, unable to resist. However, the law has to take into
account such formal elements in order to draw certain distinctions. In
municipal law, there are several procedures for inquiring as to the existence of any element vitiating the free consent of a party (duress,
fraud, etc.). No such procedures are easily available in international
law. The presence of formal independence raises a rebuttable presumption that the substance also exists. This is more or less the traditional
approach to the subject; it remains valid to a considerable extent, but
the realities of modern international life and especially the drive for
economic development are exercising a profound influence on the relevant rules of international law. Traditionally, the matter is treated under
two distinct headings: (1) when the obligations have been undertaken
toward another state, the relevant international rules are found in the
law of treaties, particularly the rules concerning the application of the
principle rebus sic stantibus; (2) when the obligations are undertaken
toward private persons of alien nationality, the matter is usually regarded
as coming under the law of state responsibility for injury to the interests
of aliens.
In recent years, there have been few cases of official invocation of
the principle rebus sic stantibus by states of the third world."1 There
are several reasons for this. Many of the obligations undertaken by states
in international treaties are of such a character that they do not restrict
extensively the power of the state to act in matters relating to its
economic welfare or its political interests. Moreover, many treaties include express provisions for renegotiation or termination in exceptional
circumstances or, quite often, at the instance of either party without
any justification. Finally, since many of the third world states have
only recently become independent, the law of state succession has provided a more flexible instrument than the law of treaties for the rejection of unwanted obligations. Still, the less developed countries and
their representatives have consistently emphasized the importance of the
principle rebus sic stantibus in official and unofficial discussions and
writings.
See Fischer, La dicolonisationet le r6le des traitset constitutions, 8 ANNUAIRE FRANgAIS
vE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 805 (1962); Seidl-Hohenveldern, InternationalOrganizationsand
the Protection of Private Property, 90 JOURNAL Dui DROIT INTERNATIONAL 627, 655 (1963).
41. See HIGGINS, THE DEvELOpmENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 344-45 (1963). See generally, from the abundant body of
literature on the clausula rebus sic stantibus, LECA, LEs TECHNIQUES DE I&VISION DES
CONVENTIONS INTERNATIONALES 295-314 (1961); VERDROSS, VOELIM RECH 121-23 (4th ed.
1959); Brierly, R~gles ginrales du droit de la paix, 58 HAGUE REGUEIL 1, 212-20 (1936).
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State measures directed against alien private persons, typically companies owned by foreign nationals, in contravention of obligations
undertaken by the state of investment, are a source of frequent problems.
These controversies are still phrased in terms of the traditional rules on
expropriation of foreign-owned property. However, these rules were
intended to cover exceptional situations which occurred in a different
social and political environment. Present conditions and conceptions
are radically different, and no solution can come merely through minor
adjustments of the traditional rules. A basic change of perspective is
needed; the whole problem must be placed in a different context.
The domestic law analogy may be helpful in clarifying the issues.
What is involved, as already noted, is essentially the wish of the newly
emancipated classes to retain full independence, political as well as economic, and, at the same time, to be able to survive and improve their
position. The attitude of the new states is essentially the same: they wish
to develop their economies in order to provide a higher standard of
living for their people and to exploit profitably their natural resources,
while, at the same time, retaining their newly acquired independence.
The best way to deal with such a problem is to confront the whole of
it, rather than try to dispose of isolated manifestations in formal legal
terms. It is necessary to stress the affirmative aspects of these claims, the
values sought to be realized (and the need for a legal structure that can
assist in their realization) rather than the negative limitations which international law may impose on the measures for their realization.
The problem is placed on a more meaningful basis when it is studied
in terms of "sovereignty over a state's natural resources." This is the
positive aspect and what the third world is striving for. However, this
sovereignty has to be understood with its full implications. Sovereignty
over natural resources is a mere abstract potentiality when the means for
developing these resources are lacking. The freedom to exploit natural
resources implies, therefore, at least some cooperation between developed and underdeveloped states, since it is only the former that can
provide to the latter the means for developing their resources. The
basic question is, then, what will be the terms of cooperation.42 Seen
42. The element of international cooperation is properly, though perhaps not sufficiendy, stressed in U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 1803 (XVII), December 14, 1962, on "permanent sovereignty over natural resources." For comments on this important resolution, see, Fischer, La souveraintg sur les ressources naturelles, 8 ANIuAtna FRANgArs DE.
Daorr INTERNATIONAL 516 (1962); Schwebel, The Story of the U.N.'s Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 49 A.B.A.J. 463 (1963); Seidl-Hohenveldern,
supra note 40 at 631-50. For earlier discussions of U.N. activities in this field, see Hyde,
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from such an angle, the problems of concessions, economic development
agreements and the like become part of a more general picture which
includes economic assistance, capital and technical, educational and commercial relations: the whole field that has recently been called "the
law of international economic development." 43
Such a statement of the problem does involve a change of perspective,
but it is not in substantial conflict with the tenets of traditional international law. In systematic terms, the rules of law concerning the
treatment of aliens belong, not to the law of state responsibility, but
to the branch of international law dealing with jurisdiction of statesjurisdiction over territory and resources, and over residents, nationals
and aliens. It is only the exposition of the effects of a violation of the
relevant rules of treatment that should properly be included in the
law of state responsibilty. The latter field, in itself, is only concerned
44
with the legal effects of any violation of international law norms.
This theoretical statement of the problem has never been seriously disputed though writers sometimes have tended to treat both the substantive rules on the treatment of aliens and the rules providing for the
results of the former's violation in the context of state responsibility.4 5
Economic Development Agreements, 105 HAGUE RECUEuL 267, 332-49 (1961); Hyde, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural IVealth and Resources, 50 AMz. J. INr'L L. 854 (1956).
43. Friedmann, supra note 6, at 1164-65.
44. See, e.g., 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNAflONAL LAW 335 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955); 1
SCI-WARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAw 562, 584 (3rd ed. 1957); Ago, Le dilit internatirnal, 68 HAGUE RE UEIL 415 (1939). For an articulate exposition of the position outlined in the text, see Sorensen, Principesde droit internationalpublic, 101 HAGUE RECUEL
1, 217-18 (1960).
45. The International Law Commission's study of the subject is characteristic in
this respect. In his first report on international responsibility, the Special Rapporteur
dealt with the subject as a whole, expressly stating that it was not limited to the topic
of responsibility for injury to aliens. In view of the complexity and extent of the
general subject, however, he indicated that the specific topic of state responsibility for
damage to the person or property of aliens, being the topic that was "most ripe for codification," should be considered first. See 1956-Il INTERNATioNAL L. CONVIet'N YE~aooK 173,
221 (1957) (U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/96). Since a report and not a draft convention was
involved, the Commission did not give the Special Rapporteur any precise directives on
this or any other point. See 1956-I YEARBOOK 232, 233, 236, 240, 248 (1956); 1957-Il
YEARBooK 104-05 (1958) (U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/106). Accordingly, the subsequent
reports dealt with various aspects of the limited topic. After the 1960 and 1961 debates
at the Sixth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on the work of the International
Law Commission, the study of the topic of state responsibility was again undertaken and
a subcommittee was appointed for a preliminary examination; see U.N. Doc. No. A/5209
(1961). The subcommittee recommended that the Commission should start by defining
the general rules which govern international responsibility, such as the "determination
of the component parts of the international wrongful act," the "various kinds of viola-
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This is convenient, because most of the cases adjudicated by international
tribunals and commissions involving the responsibility of states have
arisen in connection with damage to the person or the property of aliens.
If, however, this method were to be followed with respect to other international law branches as well, the law of international responsibility
would in effect include the whole of international law, both substance
and procedure. The law of international responsibility is then more
correctly understood as the branch of international law which states
the general principles that govern the responsibility of states and the
duty of reparation for internationally wrongful acts.
There is no doubt that the shift of focus from the negative statement
of what a state can and cannot do with respect to aliens and their property to the affirmative inquiry into the conditions under which the
state's utilization of its natural resources can be more effective is due
largely to the efforts of the third world. Such a restatement of the
problem is surely to its interest, but it is also in the general interest
of the international community, since, in addition to properly stressing
the importance of developing the world's natural resources, it also offers
better possibilities for compromise between the diverging interests of
states whose social and political structure, degree of development, and
ideological commitment differ widely. At the same time, this restatement offers an opportunity for fuller cooperation between nations in
developing their respective resources and ultimately raising the standard
of living of their peoples. The recognition of the underlying unity of
the problems of international trade, economic assistance and foreign investment is a first step in the search for those legal norms and institutional arrangements that will make fuller international economic development possible. 6
The exact form of the arrangements and the content of the norms are
tion of international obligations" giving rise to international responsibility, the duty to
make reparation and the forms that reparation may take. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/
152(1962). The International Law Commission agreed to proceed in the direction suggested by the subcommittee and appointed a Special Rapporteur on the subject. See
U.N. Doc. No. A/5509, repr. in 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 241, 318-20 (1964).
46. Whether or not intended to that effect, the "Hickenlooper amendment" to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (Supp. IV, 1962), providing for termination of economic aid to states taking American property without offering compensation, serves to emphasize the unity of the various legal aspects of the problem of international economic development. It also serves to show, once again, the futility of a strict
distinction between public and private law problems in international affairs. On the
amendment itself, see Lillich, The Protection of Foreign Investment and the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1962, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 405 (1963).
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not clear yet. The basic difficulty lies in the divergence of political and
social regimes existing in today's world. Traditional international law
rules on economic relations reflect the nineteenth century conception
of a liberal state, where economic activities are almost exclusively in the
hands of private persons and where the state's chief role lies in providing
the legal, institutional and political framework for such private activity.
This conception of the state, in its pure form, does not prevail now,
even in the states which claim to have retained it. Today there are many
other kinds of regimes-regimes in which the private individual's activities
are variously restricted. The influence of this situation on the effectiveness of the traditional international law norms governing commercial
relations and foreign investment is evident, but the solutions of the
problems that have arisen are much less so. The problems, and perhaps
the possible solutions, can be profitably discussed with particular reference to the international law regarding the treatment of alien property.
There are, at this moment, three distinct positions on the matter. The
first is by and large the traditional international law position (though
there is considerable uncertainty as to its precise content) and is espoused
today by most Western states. According to this view, there is an objective international law standard which specifically provides how property owned by aliens should be treated. Thus, aliens should not be
unjustly discriminated against through taxation, exchange regulation,
etc., and their property should not be taken by the state except for a
public purpose-and then without discrimination and with payment of
just compensation. The precise meaning of "unjust discrimination" or
47
"just compensation" is not clear.
A second position, also based on traditional international law and supported by the Latin American states, views the international law requirement as of a contingent character, states being bound to treat the
47. Traditional international law allows a considerable degree of differentiation (i.e.,
discrimination) between aliens and nationals in many matters, probably including property. Such discrimination may become unjust when it goes beyond a certain point, but
the point is not well determined. The writers, however, generally insist on the validity
of the requirement of nondiscrimination. See, e.g., FOUILLOUX, LA NATIONALISATION ET
LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc 256-60 (1963); FRIEDIIAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 189-93 (1953); WVHTE, NATIONALISATION OF FoREIGN PROPERTY 119-44
(1961). Most current controversy centers around the requirement of compensation. From
the voluminous recent literature, see id. at 183; Dawson & Weston, "Prmnpt, Adequate and Effective:" A Universal Standard of Conpensation?, 30 FORDIHAM L. REV. 727
(1962); Jimenez de Arechaga, The Duty .to Compensate for the Nationalization of Foreign Property (memorandum submitted to the International Law Commission Subcommittee on State Responsibility), in U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/152, Annex II (1963).
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property of aliens in substantially the same manner in which they treat
the property of their own nationals. This is the principle of "national
treatment" or, better, of "equality of treatment." In the words of a
majority of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, the principle is
"that there is no responsibility to an alien except in those instances in
which the state is responsible to a national." 48
Finally, according to a third position not always clearly distinguished
from the second, an alien's property should be treated in accordance
with local laws, whatever their content and international law should
allow states to act in any manner they see fit. This view has been strongly
supported by Soviet jurists:
International law does not consider the nature of property rights
nor does it regulate property relations within a state. Under international law states are sovereign, therefore only municipal and not international law can regulate all matters connected with the acquisition,
transfer and loss of ownership rights, including the loss of ownership
under the terms of a nationalization law. This cannot become a subject for discussion by another state. The laws of the state carrying
out the nationalization, and not international law, determine the conditions under which property is taken from private persons and in
particular to whom the law extends, whether or not compensation
shall be paid, etc., etc. This postulate applies equally to the property
49
of aliens.
The implication is clear that the host state's measures may be discriminatory. Though statements in qualified support of "equality of
treatment" are found in Soviet doctrine, 50 it would seem that this standard is understood in a negative rather than a positive sense. That is
to say,. while "foreigners cannot enjoy greater rights than the citizens
of the country concerned," "' they may enjoy less.
An apparently similar position has been enunciated in somewhat am48.

INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE, CONTRIBUTION OF THE AMERICAN CONTINENT

TO THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT GOVERN THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE

12 (1962). The report was signed by six of the eight members of the Committee
with the other two dissenting.
49. Vilkov, Nationalization and International Law, 1960 SoviaT YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL L. 58, 78 (quoted from summary in English).
50. See, e.g., Tunkin, The Problem of State Responsibility in the International Law
Commission, 1960 SOVIET YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL L. 92, 103-04 (English summary).
51. See Yevgenyev, The Subject of InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 89, 132
(Kozhevnikov ed. 1957). See also Chizhov, Population in InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 136, 174 (Kozhevnikov ed. 1957).
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biguous terms by the Asian African Legal Consultative Committee. In
the "principles concerning admission and treatment of aliens" adopted
by the Committee in 1961, it is first provided that "subject to local
laws, regulations, and orders and subject also to the conditions imposed
for his admission into the State, an alien shall have the right to acquire,
hold and dispose of property." 12 It is then further stated that "the State
shall, however, have the right to acquire, expropriate or nationalize
the property of an alien. Compensation shall be paid for such acquisition, expropriation or nationalization in accordance with local laws,
regulations and orders." 53 Since no general statement as to "equality
of treatment" or nondiscrimination is included in these principles, the
"local laws, regulations and orders" may well be directed solely against
aliens or against a single category of aliens. Though compensation is
mentioned, there is no actual requirement that any compensation be
paid.5 4 The commentary proposed by the Committee's secretariat does
not throw any light on the precise meaning of these articles. In fact,
both the text of the commentary and the authorities cited therein seem
to express policies contradictory to those that the text of the principles
appears to be stating.
There is an irreconcilable conflict between the three principal points
of view, and this conflict persists as long as one insists on approaching
these questions on the basis of traditional doctrines and concepts. What
is needed is a radical change of approach, a reassessment of the objectives sought by the international law rules in this field. It is evident
that each of the three approaches described can be upheld on the basis
of the values, or sets of values, that this branch of international law is
deemed to serve. If respect for private property is the chief value
sought, then the traditional approach in terms of a specific international
standard of treatment is valid. If the principle of sovereignty and national independence is the highest value, then the third position, providing for treatment in accordance with local law can be validly upheld.
If a compromise is sought between the two principles, then the standard
of equality of treatment appears to be a reasonable way to achieve it.
It has already been noted, however, that the law concerning the treatment of foreign property is today part of a wider field, covering the
52. ASIAN AFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE Co mITTEE, FOURTH SESSION, TOKYO, 1961,
REPORT OF THE SESSION 49, Article I1, at 119 (1961).

53. Id., Article 12, at 131.
54. It is noteworthy that the Japanese delegation refused to accept this formulation
and insisted that reference should be made to "just" compensation. Ibid.
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problems of international economic development. The purpose of the
international law norms on the matter is then to assure the optimal
development of the world's natural resources consistent with the maximization of benefits to the state and the region in which the resources
are located.">
When tested against this objective all three positions are found wanting. General adoption of the traditional international minimum standard
approach would encourage the investment of Western private capital
in the developing countries, and thus promote the development of their
natural resources. At the same time, through its requirement of full
compensation for any taking of, or injury to, alien property, it limits
the freedom of these countries to take the measures they may later deem
necessary for their economic development. It thus tends to import
highly rigid elements in a field where, in view of the rapid technological
and other developments, flexibility is of the essence. In judging the
probable effectiveness of this standard, it is relevant to note that it is
most unlikely that it will be widely adopted. On the other hand, the
standard of equality of treatment is also insufficient. It would give to the
host countries greater flexibility, but it would provide too little security
and certainty to the prospective foreign investors. Granted that complete certainty is not possible today, in view of the existing objective
causes of uncertainty, still, it cannot be expected that responsible investors will be encouraged to invest in the less developed countries without any legal assurance of minimum security."' Similar objections are,
of course, applicable to the third position described, which would not
offer the investors even the limited assurances of equality of treatment.
This last position is not reflected in the actual state practice of the past
or of the present.
55. Note again the double emphasis on "international co-operation for the economic
development of developing countries" and on "economic independence" and "permanent sovereignty over natural resources" in U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 1803 (XVII),
Dec. 14, 1962.

56. It is important to note that the lack of security in a given country does not necessarily result in the total absence of private foreign investment therein; from the point
of view of the general interest of the world community, this may have been a lesser
evil. But lack of security will usually encourage the undertaking of the wrong kind of
investment. While investors thinking in terms of long-run 'operations will be discouraged, speculators prepared to gamble for high stakes may decide to invest, with
the hope of a swift turnover and extraordinary profits. Such investment is of minimal
assistance to the capital-importing country's economic development; it also tends to
create or enhance a popular attitude of enmity and suspicion toward foreign investors.
57. Some jurists argue that the traditional requirement of full compensation has
not been affected by the numerous recent lump-sum agreements on partial compensa-
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Both the international minimum standard of treatment and the standard of equality of treatment were meaningful in the past. The real basis
for these standards was the existence of an implicit understanding that
the property of aliens was to be treated more or less in conformity with
the principles derived from the conception of the liberal capitalist state.
Today the situation has changed. There is no implicit understanding
on the legal position of private property, whether owned by aliens or
by citizens. This fact certainly undermines the rationale of the international minimum standard, but what is often not noticed is that it also
undermines the usefulness and applicability of the standard of equality
of treatment. For the latter to be meaningful, as a general standard,
there has to be some basic understanding or assumption as to what is
implied by its application. When its concrete content is as variable as
it is today, it is difficult to see the benefits from its use.
The Rationality of a Double Standard
An effective solution to the problems at hand must be founded on
the present realities of international relations. One of the basic facts
is the current division of the globe into three distinct "worlds" which
differ significantly in political, economic, ideological, social and cultural
terms. To take this fully into account, different legal standards must
be established for each of the different groups of states. Such an application of different standards is in actual fact commonplace in international relations. The provisions of an agreement between two developed
Western nations differ in important respects from those of an agreement
on the same topic between two nations of the third world or one betveen two members of the Soviet bloc. Agreements between countries
belonging to different groups also have distinct traits of their own.s
tion for nationalized property, because such agreements are "political" or are expressions
of charity and good will on the part of the states of the investors' nationality. See, e.g.,
XVORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 124, 157 (1959). This approach
has an interesting parallel in that of those who argue that the conclusion of such agreements is no evidence of the existence of a general requirement of compensation in cases
of nationalization, because these agreements are merely expressions of good will on the
part of the expropriating states. See, e.g., Vilkov, supra note 49, at 78.
58. Compare Treaty with Germany on Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954,
art. XII, [1956] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593 (provisions on exchange restrictions), 'with Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations With Viet-Nam, April 3,
1961, art. VIII, [1961] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1703, T.I.A.S. No. 4890 (provisions on exchange
restrictions). It is the express policy of the United States, in its current FCN treaty
program, to follow two basic models of treaties, one designed for developed or semideveloped states and the other for states at a low level of administrative and economic
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Since we are concerned here with the latter type of relations and more
particularly with relations between the Western countries and the third
world, we shall often refer to a "double standard" or to two different
standards without implying thereby that more standards (e.g., for intraSoviet bloc relations or for relations between Soviet bloc members and
states of the third world) do not or cannot exist.
The development of such distinct standards has definite advantages.
A high degree of predictability is assured; the legal standards appropriate to states of a certain structure and a particular stage of economic
growth are not imposed on all countries, yet some uniformity in legal
standards is retained. The acceptance of distinct standards for the treatment of alien property would make possible the establishment of effective general legal rules which would refer, as to substance, to the standards in question but, as to assessing their observance or the effects of
their violation, would refer to generalized legal criteria. These advantages far outweigh the possible objections to or difficulties of the application of double standards. There is no inherent injustice in applying
different tests of legality to action taken by parties in significantly
different situations. 59 To the contrary, it would seem less than fair to
apply precisely the same tests to the actions of the parties under such
conditions.
Traditional international law has accepted on occasion the rationality
of a "double standard." If a warship of state B stops a merchant ship
of state C to inspect its cargo, this is normally an internationally wrongful act. If, however, state B is at war with state A, state C being a neutral, then the action is not illegal. It may be argued that the state of
war is a very special case in international law and gives rise to a great
number of "exceptions" to the general rules. This is certainly true, but
it is submitted that the existence, with respect to the third world, of a
state of necessity akin to war, arising out of its attempt to achieve rapid
economic development, should be recognized.6 ° It would be thus possidevelopment. See Hearing on Conmmercial Treaty of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1953) (State Department statement).
59. Uniformity is good only when it is convenient .... It is bad when it results from
an artificial assimilation of dissimilar cases, each of which should be treated
differently. The nature of international society not only makes it difficult to develop rules of international law of general application, it often happens that it
makes them undesirable.
Brierly, Rdgles gen6rales du droit de la paix, 58 HAGuE RECUEIL 1, 17-18 (1936).
60. On the relevance of the state of war to the present situation in underdeveloped
countries, see Fatouros, International Econonic Development and the Illusion of Legal
Certainty, 57 AMERICAN Soc'Y OF INTERNATIONAL L. PROCEEDINGS 117, 119-20 (1963);
RONNING, supra note 26, at 56.
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ble to judge the actions of the third world states on the basis of a legal
standard that takes into account the presence of a continuing emergency.
At the same time, the elaboration of a legal standard would result in
greater precision and certainty than can be achieved by treating all specific cases as mere "exceptions" to a "general rule" of limited effectiveness.
An undeniable difficulty lies in the present uncertainty as to the precise contents of the standards. They are still at an early stage of development, and, though sometimes applied, they have not yet been formulated
in exact terms. They are being developed in several manners and directions. They are embodied in special agreements between states or
between foreign investors and host states, concluded either before
any related dispute arises, or at the time of the settlement of particular
disputes, as a result of the use of conciliation or mediation procedures.
In both cases, the concrete solutions given to specific problems will provide material for the determination of some patterns of uniformity
which can ultimately grow into legal standards to be incorporated in
future arrangements. The technical legal elements for the construction
of such standards are not lacking either. The experience of the Western
legal systems is not irrelevant, though the applicability of specific rules or
principles will have to be tested against today's realities. Comparative
law research can elucidate certain general principles of law which might
be adapted for use.6 1 International organizations, both regional and
universal, can be of considerable assistance. Already the Economic
Commission for Africa is firmly oriented toward promoting studies of
62
the legal regulation of foreign investment and economic development.
The work of specialized international agencies and foreign technical
advisors may assist importantly in the achievement of greater uniformity
and sophistication in the municipal law regulation of economic matters.
It is extremely difficult, at this point, to predict what the actual content of these standards will be. With respect to the treatment of the person of aliens, traditional international law has shown a high degree of
flexibility and has not tied itself to specific methods and procedures, so
that its standards are relatively easy to adapt to the conditions prevailing
in the third world. It is the treatment of property rights and interests
61. See Friedmann, The Uses of "General Principles" in the Development of International Law, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 279 (1963); McNair, The General Principles of
Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 33 BIrT. YB. INT'L L. 1 (1957).
62. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.14/192, at 12-13 (1963). And see, particularly, the
ECA's report on investment laws and regulations in Africa, U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.14/INR/28 (1963), the first section of which is reproduced in 3 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATERIALS 179 (1964).
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of aliens that presents great difficulties. In developing standards applicable to economic relations with the third world, it is probable that great
emphasis will be placed on express provisions of documents (contracts,
licenses, instruments of approval) which relate directly to the particular
transaction or relation between the alien and the host government, rather
than on general abstract rules, whether of international or municipal law.
It is to be expected that a considerable margin of freedom will be left
to the hosi government with respect to its decisions and actions. Thus,
in connection with takings of foreign-owned property, the probable
limitation will be, not the traditional requirement of "public purpose"
and "nondiscrimination" but that of good faith in the particular action
(or, obversely, the absence of an abuse of rights). The requirement of
compensation will probably be retained, because it constitutes an appropriate basis for compromise between different systems and points of view.
The less developed countries would thus be free to take bona fide
measures which may affect the property of aliens, subject to the payment of some compensation. A number of criteria will probably be set
up, by which the "fairness" of the compensation in the particular case
will be judged. Such tests might be: the origin of the investment and
its possible illegal or unequal beginnings; the length of time of past
operations; the rates of return during that time; the kind of enterprise
involved; the circumstances of the taking or damage, and especially the
presence or absence of arbitrary action or discrimination against the
alien; the financial and general economic position of the state concerned;
and the actual loss to the investor and the actual gain (the "enrichment")
of the host government. Of course, the manner, time, currency and
other elements of the compensation itself will also be taken into consideration. The final assessment most probably would fall short of a "full"
compensation for the market value of the enterprise, except in case of
measures taken in bad faith. Nevertheless, by virtue of the existence of
concrete tests such as those enumerated above, an approximation of a
concrete "fair" value might be achieved and a minimum basis for the
investor's expectations thus provided. The procedure for the determination of the compensation and the body charged with its assessment are,
of course, essential elements in providing an assurance of fairness. In
the near future, related disputes will probably be settled chiefly through
negotiations, conciliation or other nonbinding settlement procedures.
Once the standard is determined with some precision through the accumulation of precedents, it might be possible to rely on arbitration or
judicial proceedings.
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Governments are going to play an important role in this whole process
-not only the governments of host countries but also those of the developed countries. International economic development is a major
common objective to which all members of the world community are
now committed; it is therefore proper for the governments of the developed countries to assist and encourage their citizens to invest in
underdeveloped regions.63 Such assistance may take the form of investment insurance, on a national basis, as is presently the case with the
governments of three major capital-exporting countries, or on an international basis, as has been recently suggested.64 It may also take
other forms; the fundamental objective in all cases is the spreading of
the risks of investment over the entire world community. This is fair
to the investors, who cannot be asked to bear the whole burden of international economic development, and it also serves to promote such
development as preferred by the Western countries. Extensive assistance
to private investors, however, will ultimately involve a certain degree of
control over their activities by their state of nationality.
With respect to commercial policies the need for diversity of standards has already been strongly stressed by many writers. Gunnar Myrdal
speaks in that connection of "the rationality of a double standard of
morality in international trade." 65 More recently it has been argued
that:
Left to themselves, the underdeveloped countries would probably
wish to enter into selective agreements for granting one another exclusive market privileges through some form of joint industrial
planning. Such agreements would undoubtedly fall far short of customs unions or free trade areas .... Partial and selective discrimination is often regarded as the sin of sins in commercial policy ...
But whatever may be the case against discrimination of the traditional
type, it has nothing whatever to do with the situation in which the
underdeveloped countries now find themselves. If discrimination will
advance the development of these countries, all other considerations
should take second place. Irrelevant analogies from the world of
63. Note that, with respect to charitable activities abroad, considerable indirect control is exercised by the state, though somewhat haphazardly. See Alford, Voluntary
Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy: the Element of State Control, 46 VA. L.
REv. 477 (1960).
64. See INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMEN T, MULTILATERAL
INVESTMENT INSURANCE: A STAFF REPORT (1962); Brewer, The Proposal for Investment
Guarantees by an International Agency, 58 Amt. J. INT'L L. 62 (1964).
65. MYRDAI, AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 288 (1956).
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developed countries should not prevent the underdeveloped countries
from acting to avoid a repetition of past mistakes in the duplication of
productive facilities. 60
It is evident that any change in commercial policy would be expressed in legal terms, more precisely in terms of international treaty
law, for instance through amendments to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade and other bilateral or multilateral agreements. At this
writing, the Geneva Conference on World Trade and Development has
not yet met. But it is safe to predict that suggestions of this sort
are going to be strongly advocated, though the ultimate result is far
from clear.7 Measures aimed at regulating the international trade in
primary commodities are also necessary. Here, institutional arrangements are probably necessary, rather than changes in customary or conventional law.
The "crash program" of assistance for the newly emancipated classes
in our domestic analogy is represented on the international scene by
international economic aid. The practice in its present form is new, and
its present-day rationale is even newer.6 8 Though it is difficult to find
any customary rules on the matter, there does exst today an international law of economic aid. A vast network of agreements, between
states and between states and international organizations, is in force, and
by now a great number of practices have crystallized. In this vast
body of ad boc arrangements, a number of uniformities can be detected
and described. Thus, the principle of financing specific projects rather
66. DELL, TADE BLOCS AND COMMON MARKETS 367-68 (1963). See Ward, Imagination
in Development, in RESTLESS NATIONs-A STUDY OF WORLD TENSIONS AND DEVELOPMENT
181, 190-92 (Council on World Tensions 1962).
67. In a specifically legal context, it should be noted that trade between Western
countries and the Soviet bloc is possible today precisely because appropriate rules and
standards have been developed and embodied in commercial agreements. These rules
are not exactly the same as those applied between merchants belonging to free-enterprise
states although, because of the peculiar conditions and necessities of international trade,
they are not very different basically. The important point is that it is possible to operate
on the basis of variable legal standards, properly adjusted to the differences between
the character of the parties. See Berman, The Legal Framework of Trade Between
Planned and Market Economies: The Soviet-American Example, 24 LAW & CorEw.
PROB. 482 (1959); Hoffman, Problems of East-West Trade, 1956-57 INT'L CoNc. 259 (1957);
Schmitthoff, International Business Law: A New Law Merchant, 2 CURRENT L. &
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 129, 139-53 (1961).
68. But see LIsKA, TBE NEw STATECRAFT 36 (1960), who considers foreign aid a continuation of the subsidies given to friendly princes in past centuries. While admitting
the existence of important differences, id. at 58-64, Liska stresses the element of historical
continuity.
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than providing grants or loans for unrestricted use prevails in practice.
The delimitation of the competences between donor and donee states
(or creditor and debtor) also follows certain fairly uniform principles.
Variations do exist, of course, as a result of many factors. Some may
be the result of the particular legal character of the donor or creditor:
certain provisions found in loans given by international organizations
may not be found in loans given by states and vice versa. Other variations may be traced to differences in the ideologies or policies of the
states involved: loans and other arrangements with the Soviet bloc
countries are governed by rules differing in some respects from those
governing the assistance given by Western countries. The situation
and attitude of the recipient may make a difference as does the nature
of the project involved. 9 It is not possible to generalize further or
to be more specific in the absence of a general study of the actual
principles operating in the field of international economic aid.70 Note,
however, that in the case of the international law of economic aid, the
need for a double standard does not arise. With few exceptions (e.g.,
the Marshall Plan), economic aid is a phenomenon limited to the relations between the underdeveloped and the relatively developed countries, between the third world and the states of the other blocs.

The Changing Structure of the InternationalLegal Order
The third world has "emerged" in an international legal order whose
basic assumptions and structures are in a process of change in which the
third world itself is both catalyst and creator. The traditional international legal system regulated the relations among human communities on
the globe chiefly in an indirect manner: whatever topics were not governed directly by international law were considered as coming under the
competence of the individual states-members of the international society;
similarly, international law regulated the relationships between metropolitan states with respect to their colonial territories, but did not cover
the relationships of the states with the colonies themselves. The latter
were treated as mere objects; in the international system, colonies, like
69. For a review of methods and conditions in foreign aid, see FRIEDMANN, METHODS
AND POLICIES OF PRINCIPAL DONOR COUNTRIES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
FINANCING-A PRELIMINARY APPRAISAL (mimeo, 1962).
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT,

PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN

See also AGENCY FOR INTERNA-

ECONOmIC ASSISTANCE

GRANTS, LOANS, AND LOCAL CURRENCIES-THEIR RoLE IN FOREIGN AID

& KELSON, CANADA'S OvERsEAs

(1963); ASHER,
(1961); FAToURos

AID 44-52, 57-71 (1964).

70. The results of the research project on public international development financing,
currently being conducted by the Columbia University International Legal Research
program, should provide much-needed information.
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slaves in national legal systems, were regarded as property. Today, all
distinct human communities are gradually becoming subjects of international law while-partly because of this but for many other reasons
as well-an increasing number of substantive questions are regulated on
an international basis. The international legal order, however, has not
yet developed the methods and techniques necessary for the task of
regulating directly the whole of the world community.
The eventual outcome of this situation is, of course, unknown. Perhaps it will be chaos, a nuclear holocaust, or totalitarian domination by
a single power or system. Fortunately, these are not the only alternatives. To solve the immediate problems without precluding an eventual
evolution into a more integrated system, the international society may
move in certain other directions. Today such a movement is perceptible,
though it is still too early to tell whether it is speedy enough and
whether it is sufficient to avoid the threatened breakdown of the international legal order.
International law and the international legal order are developing unevenly in many directions at once, through the development, at varying
speeds, of distinct bodies of international law and separate international
legal suborders.7 This process goes on at several levels. A universal
body of international law, customary as well as treaty-made, continues
to regulate a limited number of matters (limited, but still a greater number than under traditional international law): in particular, problems
of war and peace, disarmament, etc., which concern directly all the
members of the world society, 72 as well as matters without significant
71. This phenomenon has been noted by many scholars who have drawn varying
conclusions from its existence. The emphasis here reflects our concern with the problems of the third world. For some of the many relevant approaches, see JElKs, THE
ComOzN LAw OF MANKIND 14-19, 73-79 (1958); McDougal & Lasswell, The Identi-

fication and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J.

INr'L

L.

1,

10 (1959); McWhinney, Operational Methodology and Philosophy for Accommodation
of the Contending Systems of International Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 36, 53 (1964); Sohn,
The Many Faces of InternationalLaw, 57 AM. J. INTL L. 868 (1963).

72. Note also that these are generally the fields in which the leadership of the United
States and the Soviet Union is asserted more effectively and, one might add, with more
justification, since the bloc leaders are the essential basis of the military and economic
strength of each bloc. Once they reach agreement on certain issues of this sort, the
rest of the world will generally follow. The Moscow Treaty of August 5, 1963 (Partial
Test Ban treaty), is an illustration both of the validity of this observation and of the
existence of exceptions to this as a general rule. Nevertheless, the role of some third

world states in this field, as mediators or as an "active audience" to negotiations, should
not be underestimated. See, e.g., Jack, Nonalignment and a Test Ban Agreement: The
Role of the Nonaligned States, 7 J. OF CONFLICr RESOLUTION, 542 (1962). See also Haas,
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ideological overtones, where a substantial universal consensus already
exists, such as diplomatic law and the law of treaties, and several more
or less technical fields of immediate general interest, such as public health
and communications. 3 International agreements and international
organizations are the chief means of lawmaking in these fields. At the
same time, several particular groups of states are developing distinct nonuniversal bodies of international law. These groups are sometimes distinguished from one another by differences in the substantive content
of the legal rules regulating the relations among the members of each
group. More often, the distinguishing feature is not the substance of
the rules but the intensity and the number of legal relationships among
the members of the group. Thus, the rules established by the members

of the Atlantic community to govern their relationships in a certain field
may be very similar to those in effect among members of the Soviet
bloc; this emphasizes rather than diminishes the distinctiveness of the
two blocs.
Some groups are more distinct than others and show a higher degree
of cohesiveness. It is difficult to deny the existence of a body of law and
institutions common to and governing the relations between the developed Western states, whose ties are ideological, cultural, economic
and, perhaps to a smaller extent, geographical, 74 or the existence of a
"socialist" international law among the states of the Soviet bloc, founded

again on ideological, economic and geographical ties. 7' The existence
Dynanic Enviromnent and Static System: Revolutionary Regimes in the United Nations,
in TiE REVOLUTION IN- WORLD PoLmcs 267, 290-91 (Kaplan ed. 1962).
73. These two sets of subject matters probably correspond to some extent to Friedmann's "law of coexistence" and "law of cooperation." See authorities cited note 24 supra.
Note that such matters, and especially those of the latter kind, are also regulated on a
nonuniversal level. In that case, they are usually dealt with in greater detail and in a
more specific context and may result in closer relationships.
74. See, e.g., STEIN & HAY, CASES AND MIATERIALS ON THE LAW AND INSTITrTIONS OF
THE AmTTI.mc AREA (1963); Hoffmann, Discord in Connnunity: The North Atlantic

Area as a PartialInternational Systen, 17 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 521 (1963).
75. See INTERNATIONAL LAw 71-87 (Kozhevnikov ed. 1957); TUNKIN, DAS VOFLIMRRECHT DER GEGENW,.,ART 241-61 (1963). For more precise descriptions, see BRzEZINsKI, THE
SoviIr BLOC, UNITY AND CoNrucr (1960); Loeber, Die Rechtsstruktur des Ostblocks,
6 OsTEUROPA RECHT 196 (1960). Recent Soviet doctrine lays great emphasis on the
development of a "socialist international law" which is said to govern "a new, higher
type of international relations," TUNKIN, op. cit. supra at 241, and whose principles and
rules are "of a much higher type compared with general international law." Tunkin,

Forty Years of Co-Existence and International Law, 1958

SOVIET YEARBOOK OF INTER-

L. 15, 47 (English summary). It is further argued that this body of law is so
new and different that the definition of general (universal) international law does not
properly cover it. See Tunkin, The 22nd Congress of the CPSU and the Tasks of the
NATIONAL
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of an "inter-American" international law is scarcely less evident; this is
perhaps the oldest of the distinct regional international legal suborders."' There are indications that a body of international law, or
rather a set of separate bodies, bearing a "family resemblance" to one
another, is developing in other regions of the third world; it is probable
that in the near future we shall witness the development of an Asian
or an African international law.
The relations between the various legal suborders are regulated in
part by rules of universal international law and in part by distinct
"mediating" legal rules or standards, which differ according to the characteristics of the specific parties involved. Thus, the rules and standards
governing economic and political relations between members of the
Western and members of the Soviet bloc differ from those governing
relations between members of either bloc and members of the third
world. On the other hand, there exist definite similarities in the substance of the rules of, say, the international law of economic aid as
developed between the West and the third world and between the Soviet
bloc and the third world.
The fundamental cause of the development of such distinct suborders has already been noted: it is the necessity to deal directly with
an increasing amount of "transnational" problems arising among an increasing number of states, coupled with the fact that the universal legal
order is not yet equipped to deal with them. The specific factors that
determine the composition of the suborders are more difficult to
identify. Two factors are probably of major importance (especially
GOVERNMENT Nos. 3, 18, 25 (IASP
transl. 1962). Compare, LAPENNA, CONCEPTIONS SOVIETIQUES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
149-54 (1954). The descriptions of the Soviet bloc system available in the West are by no
means convincing as to the profound originality of "socialist international law." It is
probable that its affirmation is chiefly designed to preclude the application within the
bloc of the principles of "coexistence." See DALLIN, THE SoVIET UNION AT THE UnTED
NATIONS 46 (1962); McWhinney, Soviet and Western International Law and the Cold

Soviet Science of International Law, I SovIEr LAW &

War in the Era of Bipolarity, 1963 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL L. 40, 76-77.

Compare text accompanying note 78 infra.
76. See the exhaustive treatment of the problem of the distinctive character of
"American" law in JACOBINI, A STUDY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS
SEEN IN WORKS OF LATIN AMERICAN WRITERS 121-42 (1954). The identity of content
between "American" and "European" international law is not as evident today as may
have appeared in the past; Latin American doctrine and state practice since the last
century could be usefully re-examined in the light of contemporary world problems and
trends. See, e.g., CASTAREDA, MlEXICO AND THE UNITED NATIONS 165-96 (1958). As

Jacobini points out, however, the difference in content is irrelevant if the existence of a
distinct body of law is to be judged (as it is, in part, here) by the intensity or number
of legal relations among the group's members. JACOBINI, supra at 133-36.
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when, as is common, they are combined): a geographical factor, which
favors regional formations, and an economic factor, which leads to
closer cooperation among states at similar stages of economic development. 77 Ideology or a state's political system appear to play a subsidiary role: it is difficult to conceive of a Western democracy becoming
a member of the Soviet bloc, and vice versa, but there are many variations in shades of political color which do not appear to affect significantly the participation of states in regional groupings .s The composition of these groupings varies over time, of course, but it may even
vary according to the kind of subject involved. A state may belong
to one group for certain purposes and in view of some of its characteristics, and to another group for other purposes and because of
other characteristics. From an ideological viewpoint, for instance, a
state may belong to the Western group, though, from an economic point
of view, it belongs to the third world. Its legal relationships with the
Western states will then be, in the case of political or military matters,
those of a member of the group, and, in economic matters, those of an
outsider, or a member of another group.
The relationships between members of the same legal suborder are
regulated chiefly through international agreements, often resulting in the
creation of international organizations. Two sorts of agreements are
of particular importance: multilateral conventions in which all the
members of the group participate, and bilateral treaties constituting a
network of agreements between each member of the group and a central
common party, usually a state in a dominant position within the group.
In addition, a multitude of other agreements between states are being
concluded, which are intended to deal with particular situations or to
77. Castafieda's argument, CAsrAfREDA, op. cit. supra note 76, that the participation of
the United States in Pan American regional organizations is the cause of the latter's
lack of success, points to the importance of the second of these factors. That the
regional factor is not controlling can also be seen from the composition of several of
the groups, for instance, that of the Western bloc; surely, on a regional basis, the whole
of Europe, rather than the "Atlantic Community," is the appropriate unit. However,
no factor operates in a political, legal or economic vacuum.
78. The insufficiency of the ideological test has been graphically demonstrated by
the repeated failure of the attempts by Soviet jurists to found upon it a theory of
international law. See LAPENNA, op. cit. supra, note 75, at 69-79, passir ; SCHLESINGER,
Sovmr LEGAL THEORY 275-90 (1945). These views have now been explicitly rejected,
and Professor Tunkin has unequivocally stated that, for international law to exist, neither
an underlying identity of interests nor the absence of ideological conflict is needed. See
Tunkin, Co-Existence and International Law, 95 HAGUE RECUEIL 1, 46, 53, 59 (1958).
These affirmations, however, are somewhat at variance with the recently increased
emphasis on the originality of "socialist international law." See note 75 supra.
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resolve specific problems or disputes. The incidence of such "casual"
agreements among members of the same group of states is higher than
between states belonging to different groups."9 Agreements of this sort
are often of limited general importance. However, by resolving specific
problems, establishing particular kinds and patterns of legal relationships and creating or sanctioning new factual relationships and situations,
they serve to indicate and promote legal change at its incipiency. They
are the materials upon which scholars or statesmen may base their
predictions of present and future trends.
It is too early to tell whether distinct international customary rules
may develop. Although it is probable that custom will not be the main
law-creating technique, treaty relationships and the practice of international organizations may lead to the establishment of certain distinct
legal standards. This will make possible the application of the same legal
norms in different manners in each suborder in accordance with its
particular needs and characteristics.
The development of distinct international legal suborders is not
necessarily subversive of universal international law. In many cases
the new, nonuniversal rules regulate matters that were previously left
to the exclusive competence of individual states or that, while traditionally belonging to international law, are now controlled in much greater
detail and more directly. The present developments, then, may actually
strengthen the international legal order, since they substitute international (even if not universal) legal norms for national ones. In this
context, the role of the third world appears essentially positive; paradoxically, its emergence has strengthened the international legal order
precisely by increasing the number and the intensity of the differences
and conflicts of interests among the members of the world society. In
the first decade after the Second World War, the international legal
order was being threatened by the struggle between txvo powerful
blocs whose conceptions of the international order not only were
different but were claimed to be incompatible. The emergence of the
third world did not eliminate the conflict, but it has changed its character by introducing powerful new elements of diversity. The role
of universal international law and organization has now become more
important, since these provide a degree of cohesiveness, the need for
which is more evident in a pluralistic than in a bipolar world society. In
79. For some tentative indications with respect to third world states see Quermonne,
Les engagements internationaux des nouveaux itats, in LEs NOUVEAUX LTATS DANS LES
RELATIONS INTER'NATIONALEs 323, 344-47 (Duroselle & Meyriat eds. 1962).
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the same manner, the appearance of new interests and points of view,
acting as balancing elements between the two "poles," has improved
the stability of the international legal order.

